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“We as a Nation have long neglected the mentally ill . . .”1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Jails have come to replace psychiatric hospitals as repositories for people with mental 
illness.  In New York City, Rikers has become one of the nation’s largest inpatient mental health 
centers, second only to the L.A. County Jail.  A disproportionate number of these psychiatrically 
disabled individuals end up in solitary confinement, doing “Bing time”2 for rule infractions 
precipitated by their illness.  Resultantly, years of activism by the Jails Action Coalition and two 
scathing reports commissioned by the New York City Board of Correction have finally spurred 
efforts to reduce the use of solitary and improve mental health treatment on Rikers. 
Queens and Bronx Counties have presented examples of two alternatives to traditional 
incarceration of offenders afflicted with mental illness.  Bronx Mental Health Court
3
 is a 
community-involved initiative that seeks to address treatment needs while also reducing 
recidivism.  Queens TASC Mental Health Diversion Program
4
 manages both the Queens 
Misdemeanor Mental Health Court and the Queens Felony Mental Health Court in order to divert 
individuals with serious mental illness from current or potential incarceration.    
While still not a national protocol, the practice of Mental Health Alternatives to 
Incarceration (“MHATI”) is a form of justice that satisfies the standards devised in John Finnis’ 
Natural Law framework for morality. Specifically, Mental Health Alternatives to Incarceration 
                                                 
1
 Remarks [of President John F. Kennedy] on Proposed Measures To Combat Mental Illness and Mental 
Retardation, PUB. PAPERS 137, 138 (Feb. 5, 1963) 
2
 “Bing time” is jargon used to refer to punitive segregation imposed on prisoners for behavioral 
infractions during their incarceration. 
3
 The Bronx Mental Health Court’s state goal is “to prevent mentally ill individuals from committing 
crimes and to ensure their proper treatment.”  See http://www.eacinc.org/bronx-tasc-mental-health-court-
program (April 5, 2014, 5:13PM). 
4
 The Queens TASC Mental Health Diversion Program is provided by the EAC Network, which is 
motivated as follows: “Our mission is to respond to human needs with programs and services that protect 
children, promote healthy families and communities, help seniors and empower individuals to take 
control of their lives.”  See http://www.eacinc.org/about (April 5, 2014, 5:22PM). 
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properly addresses Finnis’ goods of life, knowledge, sociability, and practical reasonableness, 
and has been developed with the common good and justice in consideration.  Accordingly, 
because MHATI meets Finnis’ framework, in creation and in practice, for moral justifiability, it 
stands as good law, in both the moral and legal senses.  
A. Department of Corrections:  Rikers Island and Mental Health 
There are three times as many people with serious mental illness in U.S. jails and prisons 
than in state psychiatric hospitals—many of them incarcerated for low-level, nonviolent offenses 
that result from an untreated psychiatric condition.
5
  People with mental illness do not fare well 
in correctional facilities, where they are more likely to be victimized and housed in solitary 
confinement.
6
  Historically, justice systems have been ill-equipped to address the needs of this 
population due to a lack of adequate treatment services coupled with poor collaboration with 
community-based health organizations. 
The New York City Department Of Correction (DOC) imposes punitive segregation
7
 on 
pretrial detainees and sentenced prisoners for behavioral infractions during their incarceration. 
They are imposed on adult and adolescent prisoners alike.  Prisoners in punitive segregation are 
locked inside specially designed single‐occupancy cells for 23 hours per day, with one hour of 
recreation and access to daily showers in the housing unit.
8
  Despite these strict measures, the 
                                                 
5
 This provocative conclusion comes from a 2010 study conducted by the Treatment Advocacy Center 
and National Sheriffs Association.  This study focused on a comprehensive study of all 50 states to 
determine the percentage of individuals with mental health problems who were incarcerated instead of 
treated for their illness. See 
 http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/final_jails_v_hospitals_study.pdf (April 8, 
2014, 7:25 PM). 
6
 See 7 NYCRR 6, §§ 320.2, 320.4, 320.5 (2014); cf generally, NYC.gov staff report regarding conditions 
for mentally ill adolescents in the prison system. 
 http://www.nyc.gov/html/boc/downloads/pdf/reports/Three_Adolescents_BOC_staff_report.pdf (April 8, 
2014, 8:38 PM) [hereinafter NYC.GOV STAFF REPORT]. 
7
 “Punitive segregation” is also known as “solitary confinement,” “isolated confinement,” the “box,” or 
the “bing.” 
8
 NYC.GOV STAFF REPORT, supra note 6 at iii, n.3. 
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Minimum Standards at least require access to health care services and visits for prisoners in 
punitive segregation. However before prisoners are permitted to leave their cells, they must be 
handcuffed.
9
  Often times, incarcerated individuals with mental illness suffer from behavioral 
infractions during their term in prison. 
At Rikers Island, infracted prisoners are placed in one of several punitive segregation 
units: two punitive segregation units at the RND Complex (the “RNDC”), a Central Punitive 
Segregation Unit (“CPSU”) at the OB Correctional Center, a Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”)10 
at RNDC, and the Mental Health Assessment Unit for Infracted Inmates (“MHAUII”)11 at the 
GRV Center.
12
  RHU And MHAUII are housing units for infracted prisoners with mental 
illnesses who require more intensive mental health services.
13
 
1. Rikers Island: Mental Health Board and Standards 
Spurred by a longstanding concern about inmate suicides, the Department of Corrections’ 
Board of Mental Health (the “Board”) developed rules and standards in order to promote the 
delivery of appropriate correctional health and mental health services.
14
  The Board held public 
                                                 
9
 7 NYCRR 10, § 1704 (2014); See also, NYC DOC Mental Health Standards, 
 http://www.nyc.gov/html/boc/downloads/pdf/mental_health_minimum_standards.pdf (April 6, 2014, 
6:25 PM). 
10
 According to the DOC, the Restricted Housing Unit is a housing unit for infracted prisoners with 
mental illness, and it features a self‐paced, multi‐phase behavioral modification program provided in a 
group setting by mental health Staff from the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. Upon transfer to 
RHU, prisoners start at level zero and are placed under lock‐in 23 hours per day.  As they move up in 
phases, they earn additional out‐of‐cell time. Prisoners who complete the program may see as much as a 
50% reduction of their punitive segregation sentence. See NYC.GOV STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at ii. 
11
 Id.  Prisoners in MHAUII are placed under lock‐in 23 hours per day and are allowed outside only for 
limited mandated services and group and individual mental health treatment.   
12
 Id. All prisoners in CPSU, PS, MHAUII, and RHU are placed in single‐occupancy cells in these 
specialized housing units for pre‐determined punitive segregation. The more serious the offense, the 
greater the punitive segregation sentence. All adolescent prisoners are locked in 23 hours per day and are 
allowed outside only for limited mandated services. Over time, however, prisoners in RHU may earn 
more out‐of‐cell‐time. 
13
 NYC.GOV STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at ii. 
14
 “Promoting the delivery of appropriate correctional health and mental health services” is a critical part 
of the Board’s mission.  See BOC Mental Health Standards, 
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hearings in the early 1980s to explore the quality and availability of mental health services 
provided to prisoners. Thereafter, the Board worked collaboratively with the Departments of 
Correction, Health, and Mental Health, and the Mayor’s Office of Operations, the Office of 
Management and Budget and contract service providers to develop Mental Health Minimum 
Standards for the City’s jails. 
When the Mental Health Standards were implemented in 1985, New York City became 
the first jurisdiction in the country to voluntarily require itself to provide appropriate mental 
health staffing and other resources.
15
  The results were immediate and significant.  In 1986, after 
                                                                                                                                                             
 www.nyc.gov.html/boc/html/rules/mental_health.shtml (April 10, 2014 7:52 PM). 
15
 New York State Correction Law §2-04  Treatment  
(a) Policy.  
Adequate mental health care is to be provided to inmates in an environment which facilitates care and 
treatment, provides for maximum observation, reduces the risk of suicide, and is minimally stressful.   
Inmates under the care of mental health services, if in all other respects qualified and eligible shall be 
entitled  to the same rights and privileges as  every other inmate.  
(c) Programs 
(6) Inmates identified as developmentally disabled shall be evaluated within seventy-two hours 
and mental health services staff shall make a recommendation to the Department of Correction as 
to whether such developmental disability makes it necessary for the inmate to be placed in special 
housing or otherwise separated from the general inmate population:  
(i) inmates who suffer from developmental disabilities shall be housed in areas sufficient 
to ensure their safety;  
(ii) if it is determined by mental health services that an inmate's developmental disability 
makes it clinically contraindicated that the inmate be housed in a correctional facility, 
then the Department of Correction shall immediately notify the court and a written notice 
shall be filed in the inmate's court papers. 
 
§2-08 Coordination. 
(a) Policy. 
The Departments of Correction and Health shall consult and coordinate their activities on a regular basis 
in order to provide for the continued delivery of quality mental health care.  
(b) Discipline.  
(1) The Departments of Health and Correction shall develop written procedures to provide for mental 
health services to be informed whenever an inmate in a special housing area for mental observation is 
charged with an infraction, and to be permitted to participate in the infraction hearing and to review any 
punitive measures to be taken.  
(2) Any inmate to be placed in punitive segregation who has a history of mental or emotional disorders 
shall be seen by mental health services staff before being moved to punitive segregation. All inmates in 
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the first full year of the implementation of the Standards, there were three suicides—down from 
eleven in 1985.   
Key elements of the Mental Health Minimum Standards include mental health screening 
of all incoming prisoners within 24 hours of arrival in DOC custody, training of correctional and 
medical staff in the recognition of mental and emotional disorders, special housing areas for 
those inmates with mental or emotional disorders in need of close supervision, 24-hour access to 
mental health services personnel for emergency psychiatric care, and a prisoner observation aide 
program that employs trained, carefully-selected inmates to help monitor those inmates identified 
as potential suicide risks. 
2. Mental Health Alternatives: A Plan for Collaboration in NYC 
In New York City, the proportion of inmates with mental health diagnoses continues to 
rise.  In 2013, 37% of DOC’s average daily population had a mental health diagnosis, up from 
34% in 2012 and appreciably higher than the percentage a few years ago.
16
 Concern about the 
increasing prevalence and severity of mental illness in the city’s inmate population led to the 
formation of the Mayor’s Steering Committee on Citywide Justice and Mental Health in 2012.17  
One of the Committee’s recommendations was to establish resource hubs in each of the five 
                                                                                                                                                             
punitive segregation shall be seen at least once each day by medical staff who shall make referrals to 
mental health services where appropriate. 
16
 According to the Department of Corrections 2013 internal report, the 2013 statistic is significantly 
higher than 2009, rising 10% from 27% to 37%, in 4 years time.  See 
 http://www.nyc.gov/html/ops/downloads/pdf/mmr2013/doc.pdf. (April 9, 2014, 11:01 AM). 
17
 See NYC.GOV press release, NEWS FROM THE BLUE ROOM: MAYOR BLOOMBERG ANNOUNCES NEW 
MENTAL HEALTH INITIATIVE, December 23, 2012 
http://www.nyc.gov/portal/site/nycgov/menuitem.c0935b9a57bb4ef3daf2f1c701c789a0/index.jsp?pageID
=mayor_press_release&catID=1194&doc_name=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nyc.gov%2Fhtml%2Fom%2Fht
ml%2F2012b%2Fpr488-12.html&cc=unused1978&rc=1194&ndi=1 (April 13, 2014, 7:25 PM). 
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boroughs to divert eligible defendants from jail to treatment in the community.  The hope was to 
establish a hub to operate in each of the five counties of the City within one year’s time.18 
Concomitantly, DOC and the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (“DOHMH”) 
entered into a joint collaboration to develop two new programs for mentally ill inmates.  First, 
they established the Clinical Alternative to Punitive Segregation (CAPS), for seriously mentally 
ill inmates who incur infractions.
19
  Second, DOC and DOHMH piloted two restrictive housing 
units for those with non-serious mental health diagnoses who incur infractions.
20
 As described 
above, the RHU is both the place where the penalty of punitive segregation is imposed as well as 
where clinical staff provides a three-phase behavioral program.  Integral to an RHU is the 
opportunity to earn progressively more out-of-cell time beginning the first week in the program 
and an early (or conditional) discharge. The RHU is being expanded to serve all infracted non-
seriously mentally ill inmates.
21
  The hope is to develop a system that appropriately addresses the 
alternative needs of the growing population of mentally ill placed in incarceration. 
The purpose of this Note is to diagram the historical development and present practice of 
MHATI, and to discuss whether the practice is morally justifiable.  Part II of this Note traces the 
origins and illustrates the development of the practice to its present application and 
interpretation.  Part III outlines and analyzes the basic elements of Finnis’ Natural Law 
framework.  Then, Part IV analyzes MHATI in the structural framework described in Part III.  
Part V concludes this Note that MHATI is just law.  
 
                                                 
18
 Id. 
19
 CAPS is a therapeutic program provided in a secure setting and not a punitive placement. The length of 
time that a seriously mentally ill inmate remains in the unit is based upon their need for individualized 
treatment provided by mental health professionals. 
20
 See NYC.GOV Mayor’s Management Report: Department of Corrections, Fiscal Year 2013, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ops/downloads/pdf/mmr2013/doc.pdf (April 18, 2014, 1:15 PM). 
21
 Id. 
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II. HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF MHATI 
This Part of this Note will examine the historical practice of MHATI and trace the 
doctrine’s development to the present day’s primary application and interpretation.  Dorothea L. 
Dix, born April 4, 1802, was an American activist on behalf of the indigent mentally ill.  
Through a vigorous campaign of lobbying state legislatures and U.S. Congress, she was 
responsible for the creation of the first generation of mental asylums.
22
  Notably during 1844, 
Dorothea traveled to every county jail and almshouse throughout New Jersey in order to 
determine how the mentally ill were afforded care, if at all.  Relying on the findings from her 
observations, with the support of Senator Joseph S. Dodd, Dorothea Dix founded the first insane 
asylum with the passage of the New Jersey State Lunatic Asylum of 1845.
23
  Dorothea Dix stood 
for the proposition that the mentally ill deserved to be treated, not punished.   
A. Mental Health Recognition in the Law 
At the time Dorothea was advocating on behalf of mentally ill persons incarcerated, there 
was approximately 1 public psychiatric bed available for every 5,000 people in the population.
24
  
According to the 1850 census, there was roughly 4,730 mentally insane individuals in the total 
population of 23,261,000 at the time.  A century later, in the 1950s, just before the 
deinstitutionalization of mental patients in the U.S., there was approximately 1 public psychiatric 
bed for every 300 people in the population.
25
  During the 100 years after Dorothea Dix’s 
                                                 
22
 See Dix, Dorothea L (1843),  Memorial to the Legislature of Massachussetts 1843, retrieved at 
http://www.archive.org/stream/memorialtolegisl00dixd#page/n0/mode/1up 
23
 The passage of this law established the Trenton State Hospital.  See The Asylum Project, 
http://www.asylumprojects.org/index.php?title=Trenton_State_Hospital (April 18, 2014, 7:00 PM). 
24
 E. FULLER TORREY AND JUDY MILLER, THE INVISIBLE PLAGUE: THE RISE OF MENTAL ILLNESS FROM 
1750 TO THE PRESENT, 218–222, App. C: Table 3 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 
2002).  
25
 Id. 
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advocacy, the problem of mentally ill persons in jails appeared to drastically reduce—individuals 
were treated as patients, not criminals, and sent to mental hospitals.    
With an eye to mental health incarceration—institutionalization v. criminalization—
British Psychiatrist and mathematician Lionel Penrose published a provoking paper in regards to 
the relationship between psychiatric hospitals and prisons.  Coined as the “balloon theory,” 
Penrose postulated that the two populations were inversely correlated.  As such, as one 
decreases, the other increases.
26
  Unbeknownst to Penrose, the United States at the beginning of 
the 1940’s decided to embark on a new social experiment – deinstitutionalization—that would 
give credence to his theory. 
1. Deinstitutionalization 
One of the most well-intended—but poorly planned—social changes carried on in the 
United States, deinstitutionalization refers to the emptying out of state mental hospitals.
27
  The 
practice resulted from overcrowding and deterioration of mental hospitals and new medications 
that significantly improved the symptoms of patients.
28
  Deinstitutionalization drew enthusiastic 
support from fiscal conservatives interested in saving funds by closing state hospitals, as well as 
civil rights advocates who believed that patients needed to be “liberated.”29 
Notably, California was in the forefront of the deinstitutionalization movement.  The 
emptying of their mental hospitals began in 1950s, but once Ronald Reagan was in office as 
then-governor in the 1960s, he vowed that all mental hospitals in the state would close 
                                                 
26
 L. Penrose, MENTAL DISEASE AND CRIME: OUTLINE OF A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF EUROPEAN 
STATISTICS, British Journal of Psychiatry 1938, 18:1–15.  
27
 See E. FULLER TORREY, NOWHERE TO GO: THE TRAGIC ODYSSEY OF THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1988), chapters 3 and 4 
28
 Id. 
29
 E.g. Ken Kesey, ONE FLEW OVER THE CUCKOOS NEST (1962) 
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completely.
30
  Contemporaneous with his vow, California passed the controversial Lanterman-
Petris-Short (LPS) Act in 1967, which virtually abolished involuntary hospitalization except in 
extreme circumstances.
31
   
2. Deinstitutionalization and Imprisonment 
By the 1970s, the social experiment of “deinstitutionalization” started to provide 
credence to Penrose’s balloon theory.  The emptying of state mental hospitals had resulted in a 
marked increase in the number of mentally ill individuals in jails and prisons.  In 1972 in 
California, San Mateo County psychiatrist Marc Abramson published his findings that there was 
a 46% increase in mentally ill prisoners in county jail and a 100% increase in the number of 
mentally ill individuals adjudged to be incompetent to stand trial.  To support his findings, he 
quoted a state prison psychiatrist who stated, “we are literally drowning in patients. . .Many more 
men are being sent to prison who have serious mental problems.”32 
As the social experiment of deinstitutionalization spread across the country, countless 
studies began to issue, bolstering the balloon theory notion.  By the 1980s, multiple studies and 
observations indicated that an increasing number of the discharged mental patients were ending 
up in jails and prisons.  According to a study of 500 mentally ill defendants, published by Gary 
Whitmer, he concluded that the emptying of hospitals “forced a large number of patients into the 
criminal justice system.
33
  Dr. Richard Lamb and colleagues corroborated this assertion through 
                                                 
30
 See 
http://www.salon.com/2013/09/29/ronald_reagans_shameful_legacy_violence_the_homeless_mental_illn
ess/ (April 18, 2014, 10:15 PM). 
31
 Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5000, et seq. 
32
 M. F. ABRAMSON, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF MENTALLY DISORDERED BEHAVIOR: POSSIBLE SIDE-
EFFECT OF A NEW MENTAL HEALTH LAW, Hospital and Community Psychiatry, 23:101–105 (1972).  
33
 G. E. WHITMER, FROM HOSPITALS TO JAILS: THE FATE OF CALIFORNIA’S DEINSTITUTIONALIZED 
MENTALLY ILL, American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 50:65–75 (1980). 
10 
 
two published studies of the problem.
34
  By the 90s, there were countless studies conducted in 
order to determine the pace of deinstitutionalization and its effect upon the criminal justice 
system.
35
   
By 2000, the tides began to shift again and activists demanded the government’s attention 
to the problem.  The American Psychiatric Association (the “APA”) estimated that about 20% of 
prisoners were seriously mentally ill, with 5% actively psychotic at any given time.
36
  In 2002, 
the National Commission of Correctional Health Care issued a report to Congress in which it 
estimated that 17.5 percent of inmates in state prisons had one of three major axis disorders, 
including schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or major depression.
37
  By 2003, based on their 
interviews and visits to state and federal prisons, the Human Rights Watch corroborated the 
APA’s data that 20% of inmates were seriously mentally ill.38  In 2006, the Department of 
Justice issued its own survey and determined that 24% of jail inmates and 15% of state prison 
                                                 
34
 H. R. LAMB AND R. W. GRANT, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AN URBAN COUNTY JAIL, Archives of General 
Psychiatry,39:17–22 (1982); H. R. LAMB AND R. W. GRANT, MENTALLY ILL WOMEN IN A COUNTY JAIL, 
Archives of General Psychiatry, 40:363–368 (1983).  
35
 See e.g. L. A. TEPLIN, THE PREVALENCE OF SEVERE MENTAL DISORDER AMONG MALE URBAN JAIL 
DETAINEES: COMPARISON WITH EPIDEMIOLOGIC CATCHMENT AREA PROGRAM, American Journal of 
Public Health, 80:663–669 (1990); E. FULLER TORREY, JOAN STIEBER, JONATHAN EZEKIEL ET AL., 
CRIMINALIZING THE SERIOUSLY MENTALLY ILL: THE ABUSE OF JAILS AS MENTAL HOSPITALS, Public 
Citizen’s Health Research Group and the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill (1992); J. R. BELCHER, 
ARE JAILS REPLACING THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL?, Community 
Mental Health Journal, 24:185–195  (1988); P. M. DITTON, MENTAL HEALTH AND TREATMENT OF 
INMATES AND PROBATIONERS, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report (July 1999).  
36
 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES IN JAILS AND PRISONS, 2nd ed., 
Introduction, xix, (Washington, D.C., 2000). 
37
 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE, THE HEALTH STATUS OF SOON-TO-BE-
RELEASED INMATES: A REPORT TO CONGRESS, vol. 1, p. 22 (March 2002). The cited data are based on B. 
M. VEYSEY AND G.BICHLER-ROBERTSON, PREVALENCE ESTIMATES OF PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS IN 
CORRECTIONAL SETTINGS, THE HEALTH STATUS OF SOON-TO-BE-RELEASED INMATES: A REPORT TO 
CONGRESS, vol. 2 (April 2002), at  
http://www.ncchc.org/pubs/pubs_stbr.vol2.html. (April 18, 2014, 11:05 PM) 
38
 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 
(Washington, D.C.: Human Rights Watch, 2003). 
11 
 
inmates reported at least one symptom of a psychotic disorder.
39
  Thus, at the start of the new 
millennia, there were numerous reports that all concluded that between 15% and 20% of inmates 
had a serious mental disorder.  A 2009 survey of mental illness among jail inmates revealed that 
out of a total of 822 inmates (in five jails between New York and Maryland), a total of 16.6% 
prisoners met the criteria consistent with higher rates of mental illness.
40
  Remarkably, a survey 
conducted by the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill
41
 reported that 40% of mentally ill family 
members had been in jail at some point in their lives.
42
  Based on the data, one can conclude that 
in spite of the great work of advocates such as Dorothea Dix, jails and prisons have once again 
become America’s mental hospitals. 
B. Scholarship in the Law Related to Mental Health 
Three traditions have dominated mental health law scholarship: “doctrinal constitutional 
scholarship focusing on rights, therapeutic jurisprudence scholarship focusing on the therapeutic 
implications of different laws, and theoretical scholarship focusing on philosophical issues 
underpinning mental health law.”43  This Note focuses primarily on the interaction between 
mental illness and the law.  This section addresses the doctrines created by the Supreme Court 
and implemented by lower courts, federal and state legislation that enables or hinders the 
participation of the mentally ill in society, new institutional forms and their effects on the 
mentally ill, and underlying conceptual constructs about the nature of criminal punishment, 
                                                 
39
 D. J. JAMES AND L. E. GLAZE, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT, (Dec. 2006). 
40
 H. J. STEADMAN, F. C. OSHER, P. C. ROBBINS ET AL., PREVALENCE OF SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS 
AMONG JAIL INMATES, Psychiatric Services, 60:761–765 (2009).  
41
 NAMI is an advocacy group for families of individuals with serious mental illnesses. 
42
 DONALD M. STEINWACHS, JUDITH D. KASPER, ELIZABETH A. SKINNER, FINAL REPORT: NAMI FAMILY 
SURVEY (Arlington, Va.: National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, 1992).  
43
 ELYN R. SAKS, MENTAL HEALTH LAW: THREE SCHOLARLY TRADITIONS, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 295, 
296 (2000). 
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competency, and active participation in society.  This Note recognizes the law’s impact on and 
therapeutic potential for the mentally ill, a nontrivial portion of the general population.  
1. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Mentally Ill Offenders 
An estimated 26.2% of Americans aged eighteen years and older suffer from a 
diagnosable mental disorder in a given year.
44
  The criminal justice system has become home to 
many mentally ill individuals.
45
  Society has often failed to craft and interpret the law in ways 
that are cognizant of mental illness and sympathetic to mentally ill individuals.
46
   
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
47
 (SRA) created the U.S. Sentencing Commission to 
promulgate binding sentencing guidelines in response to a regime of indeterminate sentencing 
characterized by broad judicial discretion over sentencing and the possibility of parole.
48
 The Act 
sought to create a transparent, certain, and proportionate sentencing system, free of “unwarranted 
disparity” and able to “control crime through deterrence, incapacitation, and the rehabilitation of 
offenders”49 by sharing power over sentencing policy and individual sentencing outcomes among 
Congress, the federal courts, the Justice Department, and probation officers. 
The heart of the Guidelines is a one-page table: the vertical axis is a forty-three point 
scale of offense levels, the horizontal axis lists six categories of criminal history, and the body 
provides the ranges of months of imprisonment for each combination of offense and criminal 
                                                 
44
 RONALD C. KESSLER ET AL., PREVALENCE, SEVERITY, AND COMORBIDITY OF 12-MONTH DSM-IV 
DISORDERS IN THE NATIONAL COMORBIDITY SURVEY REPLICATION, 62 ARCHIVES OF GEN. 
PSYCHIATRY 617, 617 (2005). 
45
 See Fox Butterfield, Prisons Replace Hospitals for the Nation’s Mentally Ill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 
1998, at A1. 
46
 See supra Part II.A.1 
47
 Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. II, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28 
U.S.C.)  
48
 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989).  
49
 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING, at iv (2004), 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/15_year/executive_summary_and_preface.pdf (April 8, 2014, 1:25PM). 
13 
 
history.
50
  A sentencing judge is meant to use the guidelines, policy statements, and 
commentaries contained in the other 600-plus pages of the Guidelines Manual to identify the 
relevant offense and history levels, and then refer to the table to identify the proper sentencing 
range.
51
  In certain circumstances the Guidelines allow for both upward and downward 
departures from the sentence that would otherwise be recommended, even though in all cases a 
sentence must be at or below the maximum sentence authorized by statute for the offense. 
Few circumstances for departure involve the mental illness of an offender.   Instead, the 
Guidelines deal explicitly with mentally ill offenders in only a limited way.
52
 Section 5H1.3 of 
the Guidelines states, “[m]ental and emotional conditions are not ordinarily relevant in 
determining whether a departure [from the Guideline range of sentences] is warranted, except as 
provided in [the Guidelines sections governing grounds for departure].”53  Generally, that section 
permits departure from the Guidelines if there is an aggravating or mitigating circumstance “not 
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the 
guidelines,” and if the departure advances the objectives set out in 18 U.S.C § 3553(a)(2), which 
include elements of incapacitation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.
54
  Downward 
departure is allowed when an offender suffers from a “significantly reduced mental capacity” 
and neither violence in the offense nor the offender’s criminal history indicates a need to protect 
the public.
55
 
                                                 
50
 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A, at 394 (2012) 
51
 See id. § 1B1.1 
52
 Interestingly, the Guidelines deal more extensively with crimes against the mentally ill, providing for 
heightened sentences for those committing crimes against victims deemed incompetent because of mental 
illness.  See, e.g.,  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(b)(10)(D) & cmt. n.20(B). 
53
 id. § 5H1.3. 
54
 Id. § 5K2.0(a)(1).  
55
 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13. Although there is no necessary connection 
between a violent offense and future risk to the public, most courts construing section 5K2.13 have taken 
the position that an offense involving violence or the threat of violence disqualifies an offender from a 
14 
 
Moreover, the Guidelines were crafted to ensure that drug dependence, which is perhaps 
most reasonably viewed as mental illness, would not act to mitigate sentences.
56
  These factors 
coincided with the rise of the idea that punishment should be measured by offenders’ 
dangerousness and not merely their culpability.
57
  A key implication of the Guidelines’ silence 
on mental illness was that downward departures for the mentally ill, and hence the dangerous or 
drug addicted among them, were rarely permitted. 
Along with discouraging downward departure in cases of mental illness, prior to 
Booker,
58
 the Guidelines only allowed upward departure on the basis of mental illness under 
section 5K2.0, for extraordinary circumstances not otherwise taken into account by the 
Guidelines.
59
 Courts were left to determine what manifestations of mental illness counted as 
sufficiently extraordinary.   
2. Judicial Discretion from the Guidelines for Mental Health 
In the 1990s, the attempted assassination threats against then-President Bush provides a 
noteworthy example of sentencing an individual with mental illness.  The Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in United States v. Hines
60
 suggested that lurid details and the specter of dangerousness 
                                                                                                                                                             
downward departure under this section.  See EVA E. SUBOTNIK, Note, PAST VIOLENCE, FUTURE 
DANGER?: RETHINKING DIMINISHED CAPACITY DEPARTURES UNDER FEDERAL SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES SECTION 5K2.13, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1340, 1340–43, 1354–57 (2002) 
56
 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.4 (“Drug or alcohol dependence or 
abuse is not a reason for a downward departure. Substance abuse is highly correlated to an increased 
propensity to commit crime.”). 
57
 Paul H. Robinson, Commentary, PUNISHING DANGEROUSNESS: CLOAKING PREVENTIVE DETENTION AS 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1429–31 (2001). 
58
 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
59
 Booker dealt a strong blow to a system of federal sentencing guidelines (that many viewed as unfair and 
unsuccessful), granting judges more discretion.  Permitting judges greater reliance on 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a), the federal sentencing regime post-Booker allows for prison sentences for violent mentally ill 
offenders longer than those suggested by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  In particular, longer 
sentences are not imposed because of the mental illness, but instead because judges impose sentences 
beyond what the Guidelines recommend on some mentally ill offenders that they view as dangerous or in 
need of treatment.   
60
 26 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994) 
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fueled by mental illness might, in combination, count as “extraordinary circumstances.”  Roger 
Hines was convicted of making threats against the President and being a felon in possession of a 
firearm.
61
  In addition to traveling to Washington, D.C., apparently in hopes of killing President 
George H.W. Bush, Hines kept a diary and wrote letters in which he claimed to have molested 
and killed children.
62
  At sentencing, the court gave Hines an upward departure because of his 
“extraordinarily dangerous mental state” and “significant likelihood that he [would] commit 
additional serious crimes.” 63   Although upward departures based on a need for psychiatric 
treatment are barred, the Ninth Circuit upheld the sentence arguing that the sentencing court had 
departed not to treat Hines but because “Hines posed an ‘extraordinary danger’ to the community 
because of his serious emotional and psychiatric disorders.’”64 
 Conversely, the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Moses
65
 opined that mental illness made 
poor grounds for extraordinary departures.  Defendant Moses, a paranoid schizophrenic who held 
“strange violent fantasies” was “preoccupied with weapons” and had “overtly threatened the 
killings of several people, and fantasized the slaughter of still more.”  Despite being adjudicated 
as “mental defective,” he was convicted for making false statements in order to purchase guns 
and subsequently receiving them.  The sentencing court subsequently sentenced him to six times 
greater than the Guidelines recommended sentence for his offense and criminal history.  
Accordingly, the sentencing court was motivated by the belief that Moses would cease taking his 
                                                 
61
 Id. at 1473 
62
 Id. at 1472.  However investigators did not find evidence to corroborate this claim.   
63
 Id. at 1473.  The court justified this additional departure by reference both to Guidelines section 5K2.0 
and to section 4A1.3, which allows departures where defendants’ criminal histories do not adequately 
reflect their dangerousness.  Hines, 26 F.3d at 1477.  But cf. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.3 
(2007) (enumerating the circumstances, which do not include mental illness, that may justify departures 
on these grounds). 
64
 Hines, 26 F.3d at 1477. 
65
 106 F.3d 1273 (6th Cir. 1997) 
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medications under which his condition had improved while he was in custody.
66
  The Sixth 
Circuit responded by vacating the sentence stating that, given the inclusion of section 5H1.3, 
upward departures for circumstances not taken into account in the drafting of the Guidelines did 
not apply to Moses.
67
  Instead, civil commitment, rather than an upward departure, was the 
appropriate mechanism for protecting the public.
68
 
3. Civil Commitments 
The most obvious alternative to upward departures and variances for violent mentally ill 
offenders is civil commitment following prison. In the ideal, at least, commitment keeps the 
mentally ill confined and in treatment only so long as they display the symptoms that make them 
dangerous to the public. Indeed, there is a federal commitment statute, 18 U.S.C. § 4246, that 
provides for the commitment of a “person in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons whose 
sentence is about to expire” who “is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect as a 
result of which his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or 
serious damage to property of another.”69 
Civil commitment following prison may not, however, be a perfect solution for dealing 
with violent mentally ill offenders.  Perhaps, to society — and to judges — a violent mentally ill 
person who has served out a Guidelines sentence is not blameless.  Perhaps once an individual is 
deemed blameworthy, all that follows, even treatment and incapacitation for the public safety, is 
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 Id. at 1277 
67
 Id. at 1278-81. 
68
 Id. at 1280; cf. United States v. Fonner, 920 F.2d 1330, 1334 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that “mental health 
is not a solid basis on which to depart upward” and that upward departures on the basis of a convict’s 
potential to commit future crimes – perhaps due to mental illness—may impermissibly overlap with the 
recidivism penalties already included in the Guidelines.).  Additionally, the Sixth Circuit noted that a civil 
commitment statute, 18 U.S.C. §4246 (2000), was “directly designed to forestall [the danger to the 
community created by a convict’s mental illness] through continued commitment after completion of the 
sentence.”  Moses, 106 F.3d at 1280. 
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 18 U.S.C. § 4246(A) (2000). 
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tarred by the initial retributive purpose.  Evidence for this possibility can be found in the text of 
§3553, which plainly allows incarceration, rather than commitment, in order to protect the public 
and treat the offender.   
Second, commitment is itself complicated.
70
  For instance, it is not clear that a violent 
mentally ill offender would actually be committed and, if committed, receive treatment. 
Commitment statutes are, with good reason, designed at least as much to avoid committing the 
sane as to provide an alternative to prison for the dangerously insane. A commitment statute is 
constitutionally sustainable if it combines “proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior”71 
and “proof of dangerousness [coupled] with the proof of some additional factor, such as a 
‘mental illness’ or ‘mental abnormality.’”72 Moreover, no one besides the director of the facility 
in which the offender is held before the end of his sentence can petition to have the offender 
committed.
73
  An offender who is still dangerous or might become dangerous immediately after 
release might not be committed in light of these protections, perhaps most plausibly in a case 
where an offender’s symptoms improve while being treated in custody but worsen when the 
offender ceases treatment post-release.
74
  In addition, offenders who are committed will not 
always get treatment, removing some of whatever difference exists between commitment and 
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 This complication does not extend to whether commitment may immediately follow a prison sentence. 
So long as the commitment is not intended to punish or deter the offender and normal requirements for 
commitment are met, the commitment is civil and thus does not violate the Constitution’s prohibition on 
double jeopardy. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 370 (1975).  The Supreme Court willingly 
posited that commitment statutes for the mentally ill are not intended to deter, since persons with a mental 
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 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002). In Hendricks, the Court suggested that a finding of mental 
illness would be sufficient “to limit involuntary civil confinement to those who suffer from a volitional 
impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control.” 521 U.S. at 358. In Crane, it modified this 
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 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358. 
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 See United States v. Moses, Supra at note 64. 
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imprisonment.
75
 Commitment without treatment may last indefinitely, a result far harsher than a 
fixed prison term. 
C. Rehabilitative v. Punitive: Mental Health Alternatives to Incarceration 
 
In the last decade, diversionary programs known as mental health courts (“MHCs”) have 
been created all over the country, different than the practices of incarceration or civil 
commitments.
76
 These programs work at the local level to divert mentally ill chronic reoffenders 
away from the traditional criminal justice system and into treatment.
77
 As MHCs become more 
widespread and their effectiveness becomes broadly recognized, their sources of support have 
grown.
78
  Recently, the Department of Justice promoted (and funded)
79
 MHCs as part of a 
bipartisan effort jointly sponsored by the President and Congress to increase access to mental 
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 A state need not provide treatment to an individual who has been committed if that individual suffers 
from an untreatable condition.  
See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 367; SAUL J. FAERSTEIN, SEXUALLY DANGEROUS PREDATORS AND POST-
PRISON COMMITMENT LAWS, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 895, 897 (1998) 
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 Bronx Mental Health Court and Queens TASC Mental Health Diversion Program, Supra Part I, are two 
such examples of local diversionary programs. 
77
 Mental Health Courts have the following combination of goals:  (1) improve public safety; (2) reduce 
length of time in jail or prison for offenders with mental illness; (3) use overtaxed criminal justice 
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between the mental health and criminal justice systems.  See NY Courts mission. Available at  
https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/problem_solving/mh/mission_goals.shtml (April 19, 2014, 11:00pm). 
78
 Mental Health Courts require collaboration among a broad-based group of stakeholders: judges, court 
administrators, prosecutors, defense attorneys, public mental health and substance abuse agencies, 
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law enforcement, corrections and probation agencies, people with mental illness, their family members 
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stakeholders in the planning and operations of a Mental Health Court helps ensure that the resources and 
activities of the court are coordinated with those of other criminal justice and mental health agencies 
working with offenders with mental illness. 
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 Attendant costs can include outpatient individual counseling, group counseling, residential treatment, durg abuse 
treatment, job readiness classes, life skills classes, prosecutors and defense attorneys.  See SHELLI ROSSMAN, ET AL., 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE INTERVENTIONS FOR OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS: EVALUATION OF THE MENTAL HEALTH 
COURTS IN BRONX AND BROOKLYN, NEW YORK, 130 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (APRIL 2012) 
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health services.
80
  No longer simply a few scattered programs, MHCs have now become a 
national project providing mentally ill individuals a way out of repeated imprisonment. 
Because of their unconventional nature, MHCs may also prove to be a window into the 
evolution of America’s criminal justice system. Historically, the prevailing theory of punishment 
has moved from retribution to rehabilitation to retribution and now back again.
81
  Since the mid-
1970s, retribution has been the norm. Along with it have come overflowing prisons and an 
incarceration level higher than that of nearly all other developed countries.
82
  Recent popularity, 
success, and widespread acceptance of MHCs and other problem-solving courts,
83
 with their 
focus on treatment and probation instead of incarceration and punishment, indicates that an 
important step has been taken toward a more rehabilitation-focused justice system as a whole. 
1. Mental Health Courts: An Overview 
America’s court system has long struggled with the question of how to provide justice for 
mentally ill defendants. Are they to be treated like the rest of the population, tried, convicted, and 
confined without regard to their mental status? Or does their mental illness place them in a 
separate category?  According to Chief Judge Lippman, “we’ve learned that [mentally ill] 
offenders do not do well in prison. . . . [T]heir illnesses just get worse. And what happens when 
they are released without having received effective treatment? They get recycled right back into 
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 In 2000, Congress enacted the America’s Law Enforcement and Mental Health Project (ALEMHP) 
Act, Pub. L. No. 106-515, 114 Stat. 2399 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3796ii to 3796ii-7 (2000)). The 
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a causal level by imposing remedial discipline rather than retributive punishment. Such courts include 
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the system. Everyone loses.” 84   Mentally ill defendants whose offenses are linked to their 
conditions are unlikely to receive treatment in prison, and very likely to reoffend quickly after 
their sentences are over.
85
  This situation presents a challenge to judges, prosecutors, and 
legislators alike: if there is a treatable mental condition at the root of a series of recidivist 
offenses, does the criminal justice system have the right, or perhaps the responsibility, to attempt  
to intervene at that root level? 
In the last ten years, MHCs have developed in order to take on this challenge. Combining 
aspects of adversarial courts and other diversionary programs under the supervision of criminal 
court judges, MHCs actively seek out repeat offenders whose offenses are linked to mental 
illness and divert such individuals from the normal criminal process. Arresting officers, defense 
counsel, the judge or even the prosecution flagged these individuals for the program so that cases 
are adjudicated in an MHC.  The hope is that this will provide granting offenders a way out of 
the cycle of recidivism. When identified as possible candidates for an MHC, defendants are 
given psychiatric evaluations and, if diagnosed with a mental illness that contributed to their 
offense, are offered “long-term treatment as an alternative to incarceration.”86 
In general, for example in the Bronx, defendants are referred to the program, screened for 
eligibility, enter the court through a formal plea process, are matched with community-based 
                                                 
84
 Jonathan Lippman, Achieving Better Outcomes for Litigants in the New York State Courts, 34 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 813, 826 (2007).  Judge Lippman is an advocate for MHCs. 
85
 Only 17% of all mentally ill inmates receive any sort of treatment during their incarceration, which 
leaves thousands of untreated individuals, their diseases possibly worsened by their jail experience, to be 
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treatment, and then participate in court monitoring, case management, and treatment services.
87
 
The duration of participation can vary based on charge and mental illness characteristics. There 
is a minimum six-month treatment mandate for misdemeanor crimes, while treatment mandates 
for felony crimes typically last 18 to 24 months. The mandated length of treatment begins upon 
entry into a treatment program, rather than the plea date. Since it can often take a significant 
amount of time to find an appropriate and available treatment program, participants may be 
under court supervision for longer periods of time than the treatment mandate. 
In order to exit out of the program, stakeholders look for measurable outcomes to 
determine program success.  For example in Brooklyn MHC, program success is defined by 
multiple factors such as cessation of drug abuse, no re-arrests, and adherence to the treatment 
mandates.
88
  To graduate, participants must pass through the courts four stages successfully: 
adjustment, engagement, progress and preparing to graduate, while remaining arrest-free.  
Graduation generally results in dismissal of charges for misdemeanors and non-violent, first time 
offenders.  Predicate offenders and individuals who commit first-time violent felonies will have 
their charges reduced to a misdemeanor plea and receive a period of probation.  Individuals who 
fail will be sentenced to a term of imprisonment in jail or prison, in accordance with their plea 
agreement.
89
 
2. Mental Health Courts: A Fundamental Shift in the Criminal Justice System 
 
The recent growth of MHCs is illustrative of a broader trend — or, perhaps, the reversal 
of a trend. In 2003, Justice Kennedy spoke to the American Bar Association urging legal 
practitioners not to forget that the criminal justice system is more than “the process for 
                                                 
87
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determining guilt or innocence.”90  Instead, “[a]s a profession, and as a people, [lawyers] should 
know what happens after the prisoner is taken away.”91  He continued that, though “[p]revention 
and incapacitation are often legitimate goals,” it is nevertheless important “to bridge the gap 
between proper skepticism about rehabilitation on the one hand and the improper refusal to 
acknowledge that the more than two million inmates in the United States are human beings 
whose minds and spirits we must try to reach.”92  
III. JOHN FINNIS’ APPROACH TO JUSTIFIED MORAL JUDGMENTS 
The purpose of this Part is to introduce and outline John Finnis’ Natural Law approach to 
making justified moral judgments.  A professor of law for both the University of Notre Dame 
School of Law and Oxford University, Finnis teaches courses in jurisprudence as well as Social-
Political-Legal theories of Aquinas and Shakespeare.
93
  Although Finnis has numerous 
publications, Natural Law & Natural Rights serves as the primary source of Finnis’ natural law 
framework.
94
 
By first contending for, and labeling, the existence of seven irreducible, fundamental, and 
basic goods or values, Finnis develops his theory of “the good” in Natural Law & Natural 
Rights.
95
  Of the seven goods, Finnis especially elaborates on knowledge and practical 
reasonableness—with nine requirements of its own—since those goods are illustrative to 
understanding the fundamental and absolute nature of all seven goods.
96
  Next, Finnis explains 
the importance of community, communities, and the common good in conjunction with making 
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moral judgments, followed by discussions regarding justice, rights, authority, law, obligation, 
and unjust laws.
97
   
A. Finnis’ Seven Irreducible Basic Goods 
Drawing upon the philosophies of Aristotle and Aquinas, Finnis offers a list of basic 
goods
98
 for human beings.  They are: life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, sociability or 
friendship, practical reasonableness and religion.
99
  These basic goods are self-evidently ‘good’ 
and cannot be deduced from other premises.  He appeals to anthropology to make a strong case 
for the universality of these basic goods.  “All human societies, show a concern for the value of 
human life. . .and in none is the killing of other human beings permitted without some fairly 
definite justifications.”  Though not referring to self-evidence at this point, instead, Finnis finds 
support for his ‘self-evident’ principle by alluding to Aquinas’ theory that basic human goods are 
indemonstrabilia, not capable of being demonstrated.  Thus “the good of knowledge cannot be 
demonstrated, but equally it needs no demonstration.”  These goods are meant for all and they 
can be realized by all people who take into consideration what is right and wrong to do.   
All of the seven basic goods are equally fundamental.  They are incommensurable 
meaning thereby one cannot measure one against another.  Accordingly, Finnis states that people 
should pursue all the goods and should not ignore any one of them.  This does not preclude an 
individual to give emphasis to one good over another, however none of these goods should be 
excluded.  By using the word “good,” Finnis does not only refer to a specific objective or goal, 
but also refers to a general accomplishment of the same goods realizable through indefinite 
forms.  According to Finnis, each of the basic goods are intrinsic goods, meaning they are worth 
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having for their own ends, and not as a means for obtaining other types of goods.  These basic 
goods are not 'morally good' or 'moral values', but objective goods, the things that make the life 
worthwhile; qualities which render activities and forms of life desirable.  On this understanding 
they may be understood as a set of conditions which enable the members of a community to 
attain for themselves reasonable objectives and make people's personal plans and projects of life 
a possibility.  It is these goods that form the basis for Finnis's account of practical reason and 
thus for his theory of justice, rights and law.  In sum, humans should pursue all seven goods with 
every endeavor and avoid evil or values contrary to such goods. 
1. Knowledge 
The first good that Finnis derives is knowledge.
100
  Finnis derives knowledge from the 
general human inclination to be curious, ask questions, and attempt to acquire information. 
Accordingly, Finnis concludes that knowledge is self-evidently an objective good.   
Finnis appeals to self-evidence because human beings cannot describe a precise, 
extraneous source (absent a deity) of proof that knowledge is an absolute good.
101
  While initially 
questionable, Finnis illustrates the validity of self-evidence for the purposes of deriving 
knowledge as one of the seven basic goods.  Citing examples, Finnis explains that principles of 
sound empirical judgment—including standard logic and reason—are self-evident and, without 
acceptance of such principles, any objection is self-defeating or self-refuting.  Since any 
assertion or reflection on any topic necessarily seeks to provide or capture knowledge, the good 
inherent in that process is self-evident. 
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Like the other goods, knowledge is an intrinsic good because it is valuable for its own 
sake and is not simply a means of obtaining other goods.
102
  Knowledge is accomplished—
realized or ascertained—distinguishable from beliefs, since it cannot be false in the way a belief 
can be false.  Accordingly, knowledge of the truth is always worth pursuing and possessing for 
its own sake.  The pursuit of knowledge makes intelligible any particular instance of human 
activity and commitment involved in such pursuit.  As being well-informed and clear-headed is 
good in itself, ignorance is to be avoided, since it is contrary to knowledge of the truth. 
2. Practical Reasonableness 
The second, and perhaps most important good for the purposes of making moral 
judgments, is practical reasonableness.
103
  Finnis defines this good as the ability “to bring one’s 
own intelligence to bear effectively (in practical reasoning that issues in action) on the problems 
of choosing one’s actions and lifestyle and shaping one’s own character.”104  This good has two 
aspects: an internal element and an external element.   Internally, one must strive to control his 
emotions and dispositions, and bring them into harmony, creating a legitimate peace of mind.  
Externally, one must strive to make his actions, that have effects on the outside world, genuine 
realizations of his own freely ordered determinations. 
Understanding practical reasonableness is crucial to Finnis’ entire moral judgment 
framework because practical reasonableness is the good by which humans choose appropriate 
courses of action.
105
  As a product of free will, freedom, and personal autonomy, human beings 
have, and make, choices between commitments that concentrate upon one value over another.  
Practical reasonableness is the good that guides decision-making, selection of particular acts, and 
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which value to concentrate on at a particular moment.  Thus, practical reasonableness is not only 
a good in itself, it is the means of acting in a way that pursues and nourishes the other six 
fundamental goods. 
To clarify how one is to act practically reasonable, Finnis delineates nine requirements.
106
  
These are: (1) a coherent plan for life; (2) no arbitrary preferences amongst values; (3) no 
arbitrary preferences amongst persons; (4) detachment; (5) commitment; (6) reasonably limiting 
relevance of consequences; (7) respect for every basic value in every act; (8) consideration of the 
common good; and (9) following one’s conscience.  The following paragraphs will elaborate on 
each requirement in turn. 
The first requirement for a practically reasonable judgment is that it corresponds with a 
coherent plan of life.
107
  Finnis, citing what John Rawls would call “a rational plan of life,” states 
that commitments made to any particular value must be effective.  By this, Finnis charges that 
one is not acting practically reasonable if he lives merely from moment to moment.  Further, it is 
irrational to devote one’s attention exclusively to specific projects that can be carried out only for 
his own accomplishment.  Rather, humans should see their lives in one whole with particular 
activities rationally fitting as episodes in a single series.  Accordingly this is a liberal theory; it 
allows each of us to formulate different plans having focus on some objective goods more than 
others.   Finnis does not want that we must have the perfect life with the perfect balance to 
participate in all the basic goods.  In other words, he does not want each of us to be the ideal 
college applicant with all the right extra-curricular activities.  All that a coherent life plan insists 
upon is that we should remain open to the value of all the basic goods regardless of what the 
focus of our national plan of life is. 
                                                 
106
 Id. at 100–33. 
107
 FINNIS, supra note 94, at 103–05. 
27 
 
The second requirement of practical reasonableness is that humans should not have 
arbitrary preferences amongst values.
108
  Simply stated, one cannot fail to consider, arbitrarily 
discontinue or exaggerate, or disregard any of the seven irreducible goods. “There must be no 
leaving out account, or arbitrary discounting or exaggeration of any of the basic human goods.”  
According to Finnis, any coherent plan of life will involve concentration on some objective 
goods at the expense of others, but what is required is that such a plan should be rational.  One 
must choose a coherent plan of life on the basis of one’s capacities, circumstances, and even 
one’s tastes.  But it would be unreasonable if it either gives too much value to instrumental goods 
like wealth, opportunity, reputation or pleasure or is based on some devaluation of a basic human 
good. Related to a coherent plan of life, any commitment will involve some degree of 
concentration on one or some of the basic goods at the expense of other goods.  Such a sacrifice 
or concentration is justifiable as long as it is not arbitrary—the concentration or sacrifice of any 
good must be in accordance with the coherent plan of life.  Thus, based on circumstances, tastes, 
preferences, and capability, particular goods will rise or fall above others in priority, but this is 
permissible when the prioritization is not arbitrary.  
The third requirement of practical reasonableness is that one must not have arbitrary 
preferences amongst persons.
109
  Each human, as a free individual, is constantly in pursuit of the 
good in some form or another.  Although one human’s survival, self-determination, and all-
around flourishing may not be of any concern to another human being, another human must still 
regard that one human impartially among all human subjects whom partake in pursuit of the 
seven fundamental goods.  This requirement of practical reasonableness follows along the lines 
of the golden rule “do unto others as they unto you.”  The basic goods are capable of being 
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pursued and enjoyed by any human being and they are equally good when enjoyed by some other 
person as when enjoyed by myself.  The essence of the third requirement is that one should not 
have obsessive concern with another’s survival, knowledge, creativity, or pursuit of any of the 
other basic goods.  This does not necessarily mean that one cannot favor one’s own self-interest.  
Similar to the second requirement, favoring of any human being over another must not be 
arbitrary.  Accordingly, in correspondence with a coherent plan of life, one can effectively 
choose some people over others with whom to share their pursuit of the good based on any 
particular set of circumstances, capacities, and legitimate preferences. 
As the fourth and fifth requirements of practical reasonableness, namely detachment and 
commitment relate to each other and also to the requirement of a coherent plan for life, Finnis 
puts them together.  The fourth basic requirement of practical reasonableness is detachment.
110
  
Finnis explains that, for a coherent plan of life, one must have a certain detachment from all the 
specific and limited projects he undertakes.  Essentially, Finnis requires that each person have 
perspective on what any particular action or decision has within the scope of his entire life.  For 
instance, if a particular project fails, one would likely not consider one’s life drained of all 
meaning.  Such an overreaction would irrationally devalue and treat as meaningless the basic 
human good of authentic and reasonable self-determination.  Accordingly, no person should be 
fanatical about any particular decision. 
Similar to detachment, the fifth requirement of practical reasonableness is commitment.
111
  
Considered the opposite, or the balance, to detachment, commitment requires that one be 
reasonably bound to any particular undertaking.  Finnis requires fidelity to obligations.  So, if a 
decision, project, action, or pursuit is not bearing as much fruit as anticipated, such pursuit 
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should not be abandoned lightly.  Rather, within the scope of a coherent life plan, one should 
stay with a particular course of action, but carefully never breach the threshold of obsession or 
fanaticism (thereby violating detachment).  Together, with detachment, commitment provides a 
metric by which humans must remain with decisions in a flexible, but balanced, manner. 
The sixth requirement for making practically reasonable judgments is that one reasonably 
and efficiently give limited relevance to consequences [efficiency within reason].
112
  One should 
be efficient in his action in trying to carry out the basic goods.  So, in determining whether a 
choice is reasonable, particular circumstances surrounding that choice may warrant the weighing 
of particular costs and benefits.
113
   
Generally speaking, cost-benefit analysis should usually not hold dispositive weight for a 
moral judgment.
114
  However, such analysis may be appropriate where currency or a marketable 
value is determinable.  Where a moral judgment revolves around choosing the most cost-
effective project, then it is practically reasonable to use a cost-benefit analysis for that scenario.  
However, if a particular problem does not involve the use of currency, but rather a particular 
fundamental good, then weighing the consequences through a cost-benefit analysis would be 
inappropriate.  For example, the traditional moral dilemma of sacrificing one life to save multiple 
lives would not be an appropriate scenario for a cost-benefit analysis under Finnis’ framework.  
Unless a non-moral denominator can serve as currency for a particular decision, comparing the 
consequences as a means of making a moral judgment is not practically reasonable.  Overall, 
Finnis contends that Consequentialistic calculus has a place in practically reasonable 
determinations, but only in a limited sphere. 
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The seventh requirement of practical reasonableness is that one must respect every basic 
value in every act.
115
  It essentially states that one should not choose to do an act which, of itself, 
does nothing but block, damage, or impede the pursuit of any one or more of the basic goods.  
This requirement epitomises the maxim: the end does not justify the means.  Finnis 
acknowledges that one might act in contradiction of a basic good, but only because perceived 
consequences outweigh the destructive effect on that basic good.  For example, it may seem 
justified to kill a crazed man wielding an axe if it appears he is attempting to murder innocent 
bystanders.  Although it would appear the consequences of such an act would be the safety of 
others, Finnis contends that weighing the basic good of life for some over others is always 
necessarily arbitrary and delusive.  Finnis simply remarks that the ends cannot justify the means 
in this context.  Rather, Finnis might propose that a non-lethal form of self-defense be exercised, 
which preserves all of the seven irreducible goods, if possible.  Similarly, walking away from 
family obligations would not be justified, as it directly damages the basic good of sociability.  To 
the contrary, if a scholar works on a Sunday to meet an important deadline, he is not guilty of a 
violation of the seventh requirement; damage caused to the family life, which is the basic good 
of sociability, is not the result of a direct decision to harm his family.  There is no doubt that his 
overtime decision indirectly damages the basic good of sociability, but it also enhances the good 
of knowledge. 
Finnis differentiates between directly diminishing basic goods (never practically 
reasonable) and indirectly diminishing basic goods (may be practically reasonable).
116
  If one is 
to act intelligently, one must reasonably choose to act in a manner that favors particular goods 
over other goods, and such a decision will indirectly interfere with the realization of another 
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value.  Finnis explains that opportunity costs exist where one concentrates on some goods at the 
expense of others.  Similar to the requirement of a coherent plan of life, one may act practically 
reasonable even though some goods face an indirect detriment from a particular course of action.   
To clarify when an act indirectly attacks a good, as opposed to directly, Finnis describes 
four conditions of the potential “double effect”—meaning the promotion of one good at the 
expense of another.
117
  The first is that the act itself must not be an intrinsic wrong.  Secondly, 
the intention of the actor must be “upright”—in good faith promotion of a good.  Thirdly, the 
consequences of the act must be realized simultaneously.  Lastly, the harm must be proportionate 
to the good achieved.  When these four conditions are met, an indirect harm to a good is 
justifiable. 
The eighth requirement for practically reasonable judgments is that one’s conduct favor 
the common good.
118
  This serves as the basis for our “common moral responsibilities,” 
obligations, and duties.  It assumes that participating in the common good is to realize what 
would enhance the participation in goods of both one’s neighbor and of himself.  In short, Finnis 
requires that one must foster the common good of one’s community or communities in every 
action.  This requirement, and how it relates to MHATI, will be more thoroughly discussed 
below. 
The ninth and final requirement of practical reasonableness is that one must follow one’s 
conscience.
119
  Finnis states the one should only do what one thinks he or she should, or ought to 
do, and similarly, that one should avoid doing what one judges ought not to be done.  Simply, 
one must act in accordance with one’s conscience.  One should not do what one judges or thinks 
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or ‘feels’ all in all should not be done.  In other words, practical reasonableness requires that one 
acts in accordance with one's conscience. 
Overall, taking all nine requirements of practical reasonableness together, the end product 
of obliging by these requirements is morality.
120
  Although not every requirement may have a 
direct role in every moral judgment, some moral judgments do require consideration of all of the 
nine requirements discussed above.  Essentially, although the nine requirements do not comprise 
a moral calculus, the harmony of all the requirements, along with the recognition of all the basic 
goods, serves as the formula for making moral judgments.  Thus, if one is practical reasonable, 
which is a good in itself, one can be confident that his or her judgments are morally justifiable. 
3. Remaining Values: Life, Play, Aesthetic Experience, Sociability, and Religion 
Finnis’ five remaining goods are: (1) life; (2) play; (3) aesthetic experience; (4) 
sociability or friendship; and (5) religion.
121
  Combined with the knowledge and practical 
reasonableness, these seven goods comprise the exhaustive list of goods, with each being equally 
fundamental. 
The third good is the basic value of life.
122
  Here, the term “life” represents every aspect 
of vitality that puts a human being in a good position to achieve self-determination.  Life is not 
simply self-preservation, but includes health, freedom from pain, and prevention of 
malfunctioning of organs.  Finnis also remarks that procreation, not simply the urge to copulate, 
is a form of protecting the basic good of life.  Simply stated, Finnis states that there are an 
indefinite number of forms that recognition of this good could take, from emergency surgery to 
establishment of traffic safety laws.  
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The fourth good is play.
123
  Finnis defines play as the act of “engaging in performances 
which have no point beyond the performance itself, enjoyed for its own sake.”124  Like the 
recognition or pursuit of any other good, pursuit of play is limitless.  Performance of play may be 
“solitary or social, intellectual or physical, strenuous or relaxed, highly structured or relatively 
informal, conventional or ad hoc in its pattern . . .”125  It is readily apparent that play has and is 
its own value amongst the seven goods. 
The fifth good is aesthetic experience.
126
  This good is closely related to play because 
beauty is not an indispensable element of play.  But, unlike play, aesthetic experience does not 
require activity from the observer.  Rather, what is “beautiful” is valued for its own sake for the 
experience and appreciation on behalf of the observer.  Often, the valued experience is found in 
the creation or active appreciation of something with significant and satisfying properties. 
The sixth good is sociability, meaning friendship.
127
  In its weakest form, humans can 
recognize minimal friendship in the forms of peace, harmony, and safe community.  Of course, 
in its strongest form, friendship may include full friendship and even love.  Friendship involves 
acting for the sake of another friend’s purposes and well-being.  Accordingly, friendship is 
relevant when Finnis discusses community and the common good, which is analyzed below. 
The seventh, and final irreducible good, is religion.
128
  By using the term “religion,” 
Finnis is not referring to any particular worship.  Rather, Finnis uses religion as a blanket term 
describing humans’ tendency to reflect on the basic values and the role such values and orders 
play on a universal/theological transcendental scope.  Essentially, this good refers to the 
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understanding and search for origins and the “universal order-of-things” that brings meaning to 
human existence and activity. 
B. The Common Good, Justice, Rights, Authority, Law, Obligation, and Unjust Laws 
After discussing the seven fundamental goods, Finnis uses the rest of Natural Law & 
Natural Rights to explain how his seven irreducible goods are strongly tied to the common good, 
justice, rights, authority, law, and obligations.   
 Appreciation for communities, community, and the common good is crucial in Finnis’ 
framework for moral judgments.
129
  As part of the nine requirements of practical 
reasonableness,
130
 the common good must be considered when deriving one’s moral 
responsibilities.  Accordingly, moral judgments necessarily involve the exploration of one’s 
rational self-interest—relationship to one’s own well-being—and that of the well-being of others.  
There is a requirement that the “basic values be always respected not only in one’s own but 
other’s participation in them.”131  Assessing the network of relationships under which everyone 
lives is indispensable for all subsequent assessments of justice, rights, authority, laws, and 
obligations. 
 Finnis describes community as having several forms, with true friendship being the most 
intense form.
132
  There are different types of relationships aside from true friendship, such as 
business communities and play communities.  Whether it be biological, through understanding, 
through culture, or by order of action, whatever the uniting principle is, communities are some 
form of friendship.  As such, from the vantage point of friendship, one can realize that one’s own 
good and the good of one’s friend are equal. 
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 More broadly speaking, Finnis also contends that there is a “complete community,” 
which refers to achievement of the good for all individuals in the context of the international 
community.
133
  The common good refers, in every form of association, to the coordination of life 
plans of individuals.  Accordingly, the same principles of practical reasonableness that govern 
individual morality amongst personal friends are the same that govern relationships amongst 
nations.  Thus, the focal meaning of politics and law, in light of the nations that create them, 
concerns the complete community. 
Related to community and the common good, Finnis discusses justice.
134
  Justice is 
defined as an important element of practical reasonableness because humans seek to realize and 
respect goods in common with each other, not merely for their own individual purposes.  
Accordingly, justice has three necessary and sufficient requirements: (1) Other Directedness—
meaning it involves relationships; (2) Duty; and (3) Equality.  Bearing these three requirements 
in mind, in consideration of their relationship with the community, justice requires that all 
persons undertake their duty to respect the rights and goods of others.  Further, each person is to 
be treated proportionally equally, not arithmetically. 
Distributive justice and commutative justice are terms necessary to Finnis’ theory of 
justice.
135
  Distributive justice is the allocation or distribution of limited goods for the sake of the 
common good.  Further, Finnis outlines five criteria for distributive justice: (1) need; (2) 
function; (3) capacity; (4) merit of contribution; and (5) creation of avoidable risks.  In 
consideration of these criteria, the common good requires the exercise of authority and discretion 
to properly appropriate limited resources.  Conversely, commutative justice refers to the 
resolution of disputes amongst individuals.  So, a judge, by presiding over a dispute, owes a duty 
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to apply commutative justice for finding a just and equitable solution.  The laws that govern the 
fair process and procedures of the legal system would bear the principles of Finnis’ commutative 
justice. 
Moving beyond justice, Finnis next elaborates on his perspective on rights.
136
 “Natural 
rights”  are used synonymously with the term “human rights.”  Where the source of particular 
rights, especially legal rights, does not always cleanly fit into any particular requirement of 
practical reasonableness, Finnis still extrapolated “absolute human rights.”137  These absolute 
human rights stem from the seventh requirement of practical reasonableness, namely that “it is 
always unreasonable to choose directly against any basic value.”138  Further, the seven basic 
values are not merely abstractions, rather, they are aspects of the real well-being of humans.  
Accordingly, respect for these goods creates exceptionless claim-rights (as opposed to liberty, 
power, or immunity rights) for every person.  The obvious examples of these rights include the 
right to life, information, reproductive rights, and the right to be heard.  Since these rights are 
directly tied to practical reasonableness, they are absolute. 
As a necessary foundation for his philosophical framework, Finnis shifts his discussion to 
authority,
139
 which is necessary to achieve the common good.  Authority addresses two problems 
in any community: the coordination problem and recalcitrance.  Instead of acting in random, 
possibly harmful manners, the coordination problem justifies authority simply to have all 
members within a group acting in a coordinated effort.  Where unanimous agreement could also 
serve as a solution to the coordination problem, reality dictates that unanimity is simply too rare, 
or perhaps impossible, to govern.  Coordination problems are never fully solved once-and-for-
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all, but authority can effectively reconcile conflicts over the individual’s exercises of what are 
otherwise basic goods and rights. 
Finnis also differentiates practical judgments from descriptive or empirical judgments, 
which are not really judgments at all.
140
  A practical judgment, labeled S1, bears the form of 
assertion of what is good reason.  S1 assertions are valid assertions of authority because the 
speaker treats the authority of the assertion universally, to both the listeners and himself.  S2 are 
the descriptive judgments and S3, the empirical judgments, the less noble assertions, in Finnis’ 
eyes.  An S2 assertion states what a particular group considers a good reason.  Similarly, an S3 
assertion states what is good reason from another’s S1 perspective.  By their nature, these 
descriptive and empirical judgments do not have a binding effect on the speaker because they do 
not speak from a position of what actually is reason, but instead from what other perspectives 
consider reason.  Accordingly, the speaker, and anyone else, is in a position to object to an S2 or 
S3 assertion’s binding effect by removing themselves from the particular perspective.  Thus the 
primary type of statement about authority must be an S1 statement, because citizens must share in 
rulership, possess knowledge and capacity for ruling and being ruled, and always contribute to 
the common good.  Only under an S1 assertion of authority is the common good properly 
considered. 
Next Finnis addresses how law fits into his natural law framework.
141
   The purpose of 
law is to provide “comprehensive and supreme direction for human behavior” in a particular 
community.
142
  It is necessary for ensuring the common good.  Additionally, law’s purpose is to 
grant validity to all other normative arrangements affecting members of the community, enabling 
a mechanism for the legitimate recognition of resolutions to coordination problems.  To be 
                                                 
140
 FINNIS, supra note 94, at 240–43. 
141
 Id. at 260–90. 
142
 Id. at 260. 
38 
 
effective, Finnis contends that law relies on justice, which may need to be secured by force to 
otherwise avoid recalcitrance.  Failure to comply with legal stipulations must be reconciled, as is 
common in legal systems, because such failures can be rooted in obstinate self-centeredness, 
careless indifference, or in deliberate opposition, all which in some way violate requirements of 
practical reasonableness. 
In describing how a legal system ought to be, Finnis classifies five features of legal 
order.
143
  First, law brings specificity, clarity, and predictability into all human interactions by 
way of rules and institutions.  Secondly, any legal rule is valid in force or in existence, and must 
be treated as so, until it is formally repealed.  Thirdly, rules of law regulate the conditions under 
which a private individual can modify the incidence or application of the rules—how the law 
applies to him through institutions and actions, such as contracts.  Fourthly, the law gives reasons 
for acting in the present based on what had happened in the past.  It gives now sufficiently and 
exclusionary reason for acting in a way then provided for.  More simply stated, legal systems 
bear some form of stare decisis.  Fifth, and lastly, all legal systems will have gaps but they still 
fundamentally establish the source of authority in any given system to decide open questions.  In 
most systems, this would be the judiciary courts. 
In closing his discussion about law, Finnis defines the “Rule of Law.”144  A requirement 
of justice, the Rule of Law provides a basis for criticism of rules and the underlying legal system 
itself.  Legal systems exemplify the Rule of Law so that rules are promulgated, clear, coherent, 
sufficiently stable to allow people the capacity to be guided by the substance of the rules, 
applicable to particular and limited situations, and prospective (as opposed to retroactive).  If 
those who have authority are accountable for their compliance with the rules and actually 
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administer the law consistently, then a legal system appropriately meets the Rule of Law.  Lastly, 
Finnis states that other desiderata,
145
 such as the independence and openness of the judiciary, are 
necessary for a legal system to properly and justifiably operate within the Rule of Law.  Overall, 
the purpose of these requirements for legal systems is to secure subjects of authority the dignity 
of self-direction and freedom from manipulation.  A legal system must conform to the Rule of 
Law in order to be just. 
Apart from the Rule of Law, Finnis distinguishes Natural Law from legal systems.
146
  
Legal systems bear parts of natural law and positive law.  Natural law is the set of principles of 
practical reasonableness in ordering human life and human community—essentially this is 
synonymous with natural rights, intrinsic morality, and natural reason.  Positive law is the law 
that exists simply because it is indoctrinated, written, or established.  All laws have some 
elements of positive law, but not all laws within a legal system will reflect natural law principles. 
Since there is a difference between law, in the human practice, and natural law, Finnis 
defines what a practically reasonable person’s obligations are with respect to laws, rights, and 
morality.
147
  Obligation signifies things one has a duty to do; what one must do.  As is a 
requirement of practical reasonableness, obligation is a demand upon one’s conscience.  To 
explain obligation, Finnis explores forms of rational necessity as the derivative requirements of 
practical reasonableness.  First, there are promissory obligations, or obligations undertaken 
through promises and understanding amongst individuals and in the community.  Humans foster 
the common good when they meet their promissory obligations—i.e., keeping their word—
because rights created through a promise have reciprocal duties.  When all duties are fulfilled or 
completed, trust is established, which allows a community to function.  Individuals in a 
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community depend on one another, so with trust comes the confidence of well-being for the 
entire community. 
Invariant obligations, such as legal obligations, are separate and distinct from promissory 
obligations are.
148
  Many legal obligations are variable in content and incidence, but the directive 
force of the law or obligation cannot be reduced or bargained from.  Finnis contends that one has 
a moral obligation, in terms of practical reasonableness, to obey the law because it is necessary 
for the common good, one must always be law abiding, and as law it is obligatory.  This 
obligation is presumptive, but ultimately defeasible. 
In the event that a law is an unjust law, a citizen is bound by the obligation and the 
penalty nonetheless, even though, as Finnis argues the law is not morally binding.
149
  Unjust laws 
can be categorized into four groups: laws intended exclusively for the benefit of the ruler and his 
or her compatriots; laws which are beyond the authority of the law maker; laws which violate the 
Rule of Law (made outside of the proper procedure); and unfair laws that do not conform to 
distributive nor commutative justice.  In ultimately distinguishing moral obligation and legal 
obligation, Finnis remarks that for the sake of the common good, one’s moral obligation to obey 
the law, at minimum, is to act in way that avoids weakening a righteous Rule of Law and the 
legal system as a whole. 
C. Summary of Finnis’ Natural Law Framework 
Overall, in Natural Law & Natural Rights, Finnis develops his theory of “the good” by 
labeling the existence of seven irreducible, fundamental, and basic goods or values: (1) 
knowledge; (2) practical reasonableness; (3) life; (4) play; (5) aesthetic experience; (6) 
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friendship; and (7) religion.
150
  Of the seven goods, Finnis elaborates on knowledge and practical 
reasonableness since those goods are illustrative to understanding the fundamental and absolute 
nature of all seven goods.
151
  Further, Finnis explains the importance of community, 
communities, and the common good in conjunction with practical reasonableness since 
consideration of the common good is a sub-requirement of all practically reasonable decisions.  
Next, Finnis elaborates how justice, rights, authority, law, obligation, and unjust laws fit into the 
framework of practical reasonableness.
152
  From this framework, Finnis creates a pervasively 
useful tool to making sound, legitimate, and justified moral judgments. 
IV. CONSIDERATION OF FINNIS’ NATURAL LAW FRAMEWORK APPLIED TO MHATI 
This Part will apply the relevant aspects of Finnis’ natural law framework to MHATI.  
Ultimately, after applying Finnis’ requirements of practical reasonableness, and considering all 
of Finnis’ seven fundamental goods, MHATI is a just practice, in both creation and its 
application.  MHATI is a practically reasonable judicial tool that justifiably outfits communities 
with the discretion to divert mentally ill offenders to therapeutic measures as opposed to 
incarceration.  Element by element, this Part will discuss how MHATI meets each requirement of 
practical reasonableness and how it was created in line with Finnis’ fundamental goods. 
A. Goods Involved in a MHATI Determination 
Not every good will be implicated in a discussion about the moral justifiability of 
MHATI.  Of Finnis’ seven intrinsic goods, the following are affected in a meaningful way: (1) 
life; (2) knowledge; (3) sociability; and (4) practical reasonableness.  While the remaining goods 
could arguably be served or disserved one way or another, such a discussion could distract the 
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analysis with a discussion about indirect effects and hypothetical predictions of future results.  
As Finnis clarifies, such a discussion is not appropriate for a morality determination. 
1. MHATI promotes the Basic Good of Life 
MHATI at its essence promotes the basic good of life.
153
  As described above, 
diversionary practices in the criminal justice system enables and restores mentally ill defendants’ 
self-determination.  Through therapeutic treatments, life skill training, and post-rehabilitation re-
entry programs, MHATI, at its core, respects the vitality of human life; of human dignity.  As 
described above, MHCs promote remedial discipline rather than retributive punishment.
154
  
As Chief Judge Lipman cautioned, mentally ill defendants whose offenses are linked to 
their conditions are unlikely to receive treatment in prison, and very likely to reoffend quickly 
after their sentences are over.
155
  Incarcerated mentally ill offenders receive long bouts of solitary 
confinement—“Bing” time—. lock-ins, and segregation.  MHATI, however, promotes treatment 
of the illness and encourages inclusion—group therapy—in order to address the cause of the 
problem.
156
  Additionally, the participants receive life-skill training, aside from treatment plans, 
in order to prepare them for re-entry into the community while also treating their condition.  
MHATI values the individual behind the offense, as opposed to regard the offense instead of the 
person.  Whereas MHATI seeks therapeutic measures, mentally ill incarcerated individuals are 
evaluated as the threats they may pose and thus subject to further punitive measures while 
imprisoned for things such as behavioral infractions.
157
  Subjected to hours of isolation, mentally 
ill offenders in prison are treated more like animals rather than human beings.   
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As described by the establishment of the DOC Board of Health’s Minimum Standards, 
the need to address the unique needs of the mentally was warranted because of patient 
suicides.
158
  At its core, the proper treatment of mentally ill offenders, as MHATI advocates, 
mandates a respect for life.  Thus, by encouraging treatment—not punishment—out of respect 
for human dignity, MHATI promotes the basic good of life. 
2. MHATI Serves the Basic Good of Knowledge 
MHATI serves the basic good of knowledge because the underlying purpose of the 
practice seeks informed decision making about mentally ill offenders.  Preliminarily, for 
diversion, the system needs to determine whether an individual has a mental illness in order to 
decide how to best address the needs of the individual as well as the community.
159
  In the most 
basic sense, diversion seeks facts and information in order to cultivate the most meaningful 
diversion program.  Once charged with offensive conduct, defendants are screened with a battery 
of psychological tests to determine the presence of mental illness.  Next, if referred into MHATI, 
the diversion program gathers facts about the offensive conduct and the community resources to 
determine the most appropriate treatment plan.  As part of the program, defendants rely on the 
community provided resources to learn social skills and work readiness training.
160
  Since 
MHATI, at its core, works with participants to help them understand and change criminal 
behaviors caused by their mental illness,
161
 the practice directly serves this basic human good of 
knowledge. 
For instance, once courts learn that an individual has an axis-related disorder such as 
bipolar, he can be referred into an MHC.  Upon a conditional plea of guilt for admission into the 
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program, medical personnel provide therapy sessions as well as medicine, while community 
workers teach participants social skills.  Finally, after work readiness training, once a mentally ill 
offender is considered qualified for the program exit, he can enter into the community again, 
relying upon his newly-acquired skills to succeed.  In sum, a participant exits out of the program 
because he has demonstrated successful skills necessary to be a functioning member of the 
community.   
Overall, MHATI best serves the good of knowledge.  In purpose and in practice, 
application of the doctrine leads to finding the most truth about an offender with mental illness, 
as well as the relevant needs of the affected community, and therefore knowledge is pursued 
from the onset of the act.   
3. MHATI Promotes Sociability 
The next good that MHATI promotes is sociability.  Here, MHATI does not serve 
friendship necessarily between particular individuals, but rather serves to promote the 
community and common good.  The most applicable element of the practice that appeals to 
community is the use of community resources to change criminal behavior and thinking.  For 
example, participants are required to attend socialization re-training as part of the diversionary 
program.
162
   Furthermore, group therapy sessions tend to be a common practice in MHATI.  
Essentially learning new skills and succeeding through the diversion is premised upon the basic 
of sociability. 
The dissent might argue that removing an individual from the general population and 
subjecting him to individualized treatment serves to alienate the mentally ill defendant, as 
opposed to supporting the good of sociability.  While one might give credence to the dissent’s 
view that personal therapy sessions are individually tailored, the reliance upon community 
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resources and support, as well as the goal of re-entry (without resort to traditional criminal 
punishments) supports the reality that MHATI serves the good of sociability.   
In sum, MHATI directly pursues the good of sociability since a court, in making a 
diversionary recommendation must consider the impact on the community from which the 
mentally ill individual will be diverted.  Objections to this proposition necessarily rest in 
Consequentialist thinking or fail to consider the nature of the court’s role handling mentally ill 
offenders. 
4. MHATI is a Practically Reasonable Practice 
MHATI is a practically reasonable legal doctrine because it meets all nine of Finnis’ 
enumerated requirements.  First, the doctrine of MHATI properly fits within a coherent plan of 
“life” for the court system.  An essential consideration of all rules and laws, not just this doctrine, 
is to establish structure for the betterment of the legal system as a whole.  MHATI seeks to 
organize how courts handle mentally ill offenders, and strengthen the courts’ ability to make the 
legal system more predictable, efficient, and clear in accordance with Finnis’ Rule of Law.  
Whether the doctrine, in practice, is always properly applied is a separate issue.  But, on its face, 
the practice serves the whole community.  Since the doctrine does not allow for arbitrary 
retention or referral of cases, this requirement of practical reasonableness is met. 
MHATI also meets the second requirement to not arbitrarily prefer some values over 
others.  While the primary focus of the doctrine concentrates on knowledge, sociability, life, and 
practical reasonableness, such a concentration is not arbitrary.  Other goods not directly involved 
are not detrimentally affected in any way by the existence of the practice.   
With regard to arbitrary preference amongst persons, the doctrine would appear, facially, 
to benefit defendants, since the doctrine can be invoked to divert the defendant from the 
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traditional legal system.  However, communities also receive a presumptive benefit since the 
diverted individual is required to make a conditional plea of guilt before he can participate in the 
program.  However, the key to this requirement is the term “arbitrary.”  The legal system is built 
in accordance with a coherent plan of life—to manage disputes where there are violations of the 
law.  Accordingly, as part of the system, there are communities with harms from offensive 
conduct that have the right to seek retribution and mentally ill defendants who, in turn possess 
reciprocal but different rights to be treated fairly by the laws
163
 and practices that have been 
developed within American jurisprudence.  So, while it may seem that, facially, the doctrine 
arbitrarily supports defendants in some fashion, or communities in another, such preferences are 
not arbitrary.  Rather, the preferences are made in accordance with what Finnis would describe 
as the Rule of Law. 
Further, considering that anyone in the judicial process can equally request MHATI—
defense lawyers, judges, or even prosecutors—the diversion program is not arrived at arbitrarily, 
but instead on the specific circumstances and needs of the community and mentally ill 
individual.  For the consideration of the community, such a preference is not arbitrary since the 
safety of the members of the community is directly implicated if there is recidivism.   
Thus the requirement that a court must not make arbitrary preferences amongst persons is 
met.  Mentally ill offenders in need of treatment are diverted for reasons related to the illness as 
well as in consideration of the impact on all parties (the community and the defendant) because 
the practice of MHATI promotes all of their particular rights and obligations and matches a 
coherent plan of “life” for the legal system. 
For the fourth and fifth requirements of practical reasonableness, detachment and 
commitment, local courts can demonstrate whether detachment or commitment to a case is 
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appropriate by deciding whether or not to divert the offender.  Generally, to decide whether to 
place a mentally ill defendant, the community has to learn more about the individual through a 
psychological screening process.  In a narrower sense, the system has to become personally 
familiar with the individual to decide if he is an appropriate case for MHATI.  Alternatively, if 
the system decides to detach from the individual, he will go through the traditional court system.  
The actual process of deciding whether MHATI is appropriate is an exercise of determining 
whether the case ought to be detached or committed into the system.  A community will detach 
itself when it finds that the therapeutic system will not be able to appropriately address 
recidivism, or commit to the case where it finds that diversion is appropriate for treating the 
illness causing the offensive conduct. Accordingly, these two requirements of practical 
reasonableness are met by the doctrine. 
As discussed above, and with regard to the sixth requirement of practical reasonableness, 
MHATI gives a limited but appropriate degree of relevance to consequences.  This is 
demonstrated through the balance of community’s and defendant’s needs as the system considers 
diversion.  In MHCs, defendants receive therapeutic support in the form of not just psychiatric 
treatment, but also socialization skills and work readiness.
164
  Additionally, the programs require 
a balancing of the community’s ability to provide the resources to support treatment plans, such 
as housing, for the appropriate individuals. Finally, as defendants transition out of the diversion, 
the use of exit programs and group sessions illustrates that courts are willing to consider the 
direct effects of their decisions, such as a graduate’s job readiness and housing situation once 
diversion is completed.  
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These considerations are limited by the financial impact to the community since MHCs 
are generally municipality funded.  However, barring a complete absence of funds, diversion 
programs are not focused on each individual defendant’s personal cost to the program.  Instead, 
if there are resources available, the system will refer a qualified individual for diversion.  
Overall, this refusal to measure each defendant’s economic drain on the diversionary programs, 
but instead focus on the resources available relevant to the needs of defendants, demonstrates the 
doctrine’s limited relevance of consequences, and therefore the doctrine meets that requirement 
of practical reasonableness. 
As alluded to previously in this Note, MHATI respects every basic value in its 
application.  In discussing the above goods served by MHATI, it is clear that concentration falls 
on life, knowledge, sociability, and practical reasonableness.  Such concentration is far from 
arbitrary and no other basic value is in any way directly detrimentally affected.  Rather, any good 
indirectly negatively affected is not affected simultaneously as the good that is pursued by the 
doctrine, thereby defeating the necessity to consider potential double effect.  Instead, every good 
that may be negatively implicated is both indirect and non-simultaneous.  Negative effects may 
only occur as an indirect consequence of the application of the doctrine, which is justifiable 
under Finnis’ framework.  Therefore, this requirement of practical reasonableness is met. 
The eight requirement of practical reasonableness is fostering the common good.  In the 
above discussion on sociability, this requirement is addressed and fully met by the doctrine.
165
  
MHATI directly pursues the good of sociability since a court’s determination to divert must 
consider the impact on the community for which the court sits.  Objections to this proposition 
necessarily rest in Consequentialist thinking or fail to consider the nature of the court’s role in 
resolving disputes. 
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Lastly, MHATI meets the ninth requirement of practical reasonableness that one follow 
one’s conscience.  MHCs afford all parties involved broad discretion in determining whether to 
recommend diversion.
166
  Hence, courts have the authority—because MHATI is flexible and 
equitable in nature—to weigh the unique circumstances tied to each case. Unlike particularly 
strict laws, which bind a court to particular ruling or course of action, MHATI is flexible, 
allowing a human being (the judge) to determine, based on the psychiatric reports, the offensive 
conduct, and the needs of the community, whether diversion is necessary.  Further, because 
defendants must give a conditional guilty plea based on successful completion of the program, 
the referring judge can appropriately weigh the facts of the case on his or her conscience.  
Accordingly, no judge’s hand is forced if a diversion does not “seem right.”  Thus, this 
requirement is met. 
In total, based on the nine requirements discussed above, MHATI properly serves 
practical reasonableness as it also serves the goods of knowledge and sociability.  Therefore, 
taking the product of the Finnis’ goods, and through the scope of practical reasonableness, 
MHATI is a justifiable practice.  The doctrine is moral and applies in accordance with Finnis’ 
Natural Law framework. 
B. Considerations of the Community, Justice, Rights, Authority, and Obligation 
From Finnis’ goods and requirements of practical reasonableness, MHATI holds to be 
morally justifiable.  Still, it is useful to discuss some additional elements of the doctrine in terms 
of some of Finnis’ sub-topics within practical reasonableness.  Each of these topics will be 
addressed in turn below. 
With regard to community, this Note has well established that diversion effectively takes 
the community into consideration.  Courts, in applying MHATI, consider the community in 
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which the offenses occurred, as well as the community resources for the diversion, and the 
parties involved in the dispute.  Further, the doctrine involves the “complete community” since 
MHATI primarily operates to prevent recidivism and restore the defendant into the community. 
Properly treating the mental illness that contributes to the offensive conduct that harmed the 
community and repairing the relationship between defendants and the community to enable entry 
enter back into the community thereby contributes to the “complete community.” 
In terms of justice, the practice of MHATI does not adjudicate the substantive merits of a 
criminal infraction.  Whereas participants are required to enter a conditional plea of guilty in 
order to work through the diversion program, once the program is complete a judge reviews the 
case and dismisses the legal charges or reduces the charge to a lesser offense.
167
  A lack of 
substantive determination, however, does not mean that justice is not implicated by the doctrine.  
Rather, the discretion and authority exercised by supervising judges demonstrates the practice’s 
applicability to commutative justice.  Judges, in presiding over a MHATI case, must reach a fair 
and equitable solution based on the needs of the defendant and the community. This proper 
management of disputes serves as commutative justice for the parties involved as well the 
broader communities discussed above.  As for distributive justice, the overall concern for the 
impact to the community demonstrates the proportionate concern for everyone involved in the 
dispute.  The parties to the offense, having the most at stake, are afforded the largest voices.  
However, the surrounding community is considered for purposes of resources, entry and exit 
plans, as well as other burdens imposed.  The fact that each relevant member of every one of the 
court’s community receives some proportionate degree of consideration and weight in the 
analysis illustrates that MHATI serves distributive justice as well. 
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Strongly connected to justice, the doctrine properly respects several elemental human 
rights.  For instance, the right to information and the right to be heard are directly involved in a 
MHATI determination.  The underlying purpose of the doctrine is to foster decisions by all the 
appropriate parties and to divert mentally ill individuals into programs that are appropriate 
treatment, based on their offensive conduct and mental illness. Accordingly, when deciding the 
referral, courts are deciding whether the defendant meets the psychological criteria and whether 
the needs of the community would be better served by therapeutic measures as opposed to 
punitive.  While a harmed community criminally has a right to seek retribution, the mentally ill 
defendant has a reciprocal right to be punished in a manner that does not penalize him for his 
mental impairment.  Ultimately, every party is heard and the most information is extracted in the 
process. 
Further, MHATI comports with Finnis’ defined Rule of Law.  The practice is coherent, 
sufficiently stable as to allow persons to be directed by its guidelines, and effectuated by 
accountable and consistent judges—officials bound by stare decisis and appellate courts.  
Additionally, although there are nuanced issues surrounding the practice, (such as whether 
everyone with mental illness should be diverted or only certain qualified candidates), on the 
whole the procedure is quite clear.  Interested parties recommending or requesting diversion 
understand MHATI and frequently bring their requests for the appropriate individuals for the 
benefit of both the offemder and the community equally.  Overall, MHATI comports with the 
Rule of Law.  Therefore, the doctrine is practically reasonable in this sense. 
Lastly, with the justifiable nature of MHATI clearly established, the last element of 
Finnis’ framework that relevantly applies is obligation.  Here, municipalities and varying 
jurisdictions have undertaken their legal obligations to address the needs of the mentally ill 
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offender in the population.  Further, courts have fulfilled their commutative justice obligations 
by developing the doctrine with Finnis’ goods and practical reasonableness in mind.  As the 
DOJ, the American Psychiatric Association, and the National Commission of Correctional 
Health Care studies discussed, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, there were burdens 
and issues surrounding the overcrowding of mentally ill offenders in prison.
168
  In fulfillment of 
its obligation to establish humane laws, municipalities with the bi-partisan support of the 
government,
169
 established therapeutic courts and diversion programs.  Now, with the practice 
established, judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys and other interested partiese within the 
community exercise similar obligations in properly requesting and relying on MHATI as the 
community has bound them to use. 
Ultimately, in consideration of all of Finnis’ goods, requirements of practical 
reasonableness, and considerations of sub-topics with those requirements, MHATI stands as a 
morally justifiable doctrine. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Despite fluctuating awareness for mental illness in the judicial system, MHATI has 
developed as a substantially useful practice tailored to support the needs of the mentally ill 
offenders as well as the community.  Though the needs of mentally ill individuals has been 
challenged through the years, pioneers such as Dorothea Dix have contributed to the proper 
attention to this portion of the population.  Deinstitutionalization contributed to a near epidemic 
overloading the prison system with mentally ill offenders.  Concomitant with the balloon theory, 
however, as awareness grew and advocates such as Judge Lipman charged the bar to rise to the 
problem, MHCs began to gain in popularity and implementation.  Though “[p]revention and 
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incapacitation are often legitimate goals,” MHATI stands for the proposition that it is essential 
“to bridge the gap between proper skepticism about rehabilitation on the one hand and the 
improper refusal to acknowledge that the more than two million inmates in the United States are 
human beings whose minds and spirits we must try to reach.”170 
The doctrine of diversion is firmly established on Finnis’ natural law framework for 
morality.  Specifically, MHATI properly addresses Finnis’ goods of knowledge, sociability, and 
practical reasonableness.  Further, the doctrine has been developed with the common good and 
commutative justice in consideration.  Accordingly, because MHATI meets Finnis’ framework 
for moral justifiability, MHATI stands as good law, in both the moral and legal senses. 
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